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HE 1989 Survey period' was an active one in commercial litigation.
This Article discusses cases decided during the Survey period under
the Uniform Commercial Code adopted in Texas as the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code (the Code).2 For ease of reference, the Article
follows the organization of the Code.
I. GENERAL PRovIsIoNs
A. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Section 1.203 of the Code provides: "Every
contract or duty within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." 3 The Second Restatement of Contracts has
incorporated essentially the same standard by stating: "Every contract im-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its perform-
ance and its enforcement."'4 Because of the similarity of standards, cases
decided under the general law of contracts can be relevant to an understand-
ing of good faith and fair dealing under the Code. In City of San Antonio v.
Forgy, 5 the court considered whether a contracting party breached the duty
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to notify the other party that city
engineers had recalculated the contract specifications for a well casing and
concluded that the wall thickness might be inadequate to withstand antici-
pated pressures.6 The court analyzed the case in terms of the test suggested
in Justice Spear's concurring opinion in English v. Fisher7 and concluded
there was no element of trust and no imbalance of bargaining power to jus-
tify finding a special relationship between the parties as the basis for a duty
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law and
Foundation Fellow of Commercial Law, Texas Tech University.
1. The 1989 Survey period covered South Western Reporter volume 757 through volume
777.
2. As adopted in Texas, the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted as Tax. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990). The articles in
the Code, renamed as chapters in the Texas version, are organized as follows: Chapter 1, Gen-
eral Provisions; Chapter 2, Sales; Chapter 3, Commercial Paper; Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and
Collections; Chapter 5, Letters of Credit; Chapter 6, Bulk Sales; Chapter 7, Documents of
Title; Chapter 8, Investment Securities, and Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
3. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 205 (1981).
5. 769 S.W.2d 293 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
6. I at 296-97.
7. 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (rex. 1983).
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of good faith and fair dealing." The case is of interest because it uses the test
discussed in the Spears concurrence rather than the didactic pronouncement
in the majority opinion and perhaps heralds a more analytical approach to
the issue of good faith and fair dealing than has been true in some of the
other cases decided under English v. Fisher. 9
B. Notices of Default and Acceleration
Notice ofAcceleration. Under Texas law, acceleration requires both notice of
intent to accelerate and notice of the actual acceleration.10 Both notice re-
quirements can be waived.11 In Shumway v. Horizon Creditcorp 12 the major-
ity reaffirmed these propositions and found that language used in a note was
adequate to waive the notice requirements.13 A strong dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice Evans argued that acceleration is a "harsh remedy that de-
serves close scrutiny,"' 4 and that the court should require express reference
to notices of acceleration in any alleged waiver.15
In Reynolds v. Wilder 16 the court held that where the note required notice
of default, the creditor had the burden of proving that such notice was given
8. 769 S.W.2d at 297-98.
9. In English v. Fisher, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983), the court used some hyperbole in its
opinion that may have obscured analysis in some subsequent decisions. The court stated, inter
alia:
This concept [of good faith and fair dealing] is contrary to our well-reasoned
and long-established adversary system which has served us ably in Texas for
almost 150 years... The novel concept advocated by the courts below would
abolish our system of government according to settled rules of law and let each
case be decided upon what might seem "fair and in good faith," by each fact
finder. This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 522.
This language was used by the courts in Cantu v. Western Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 716
S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986), writ ref'd n.r.pe, per curiam, 723 S.W.2d
668 (Tex. 1987), and Cluck v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 714 S.W.2d 408, 410 (rex. App.-San
Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), as a ground for decision in those cases. The supreme court
itself seems to have recognized that the quoted language was a bit of an overstatement when it
noted in its per curiam refusal of a writ of error in Cantu that the more recent case of Arnold
v. Nat'l County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987), was the proper interpreta-
tion of English v. Fisher. See 723 S.W.2d at 668. In Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780
S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ), the court also used the more analytical
approach described in the Spears's concurring opinion.
10. See, e.g., Williamson v. Dunlap, 693 S.W.2d 373, 374 (rex. 1985) (no right to acceler-
ate when no notice of intent to accelerate given); Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, 695 S.W.2d 815,
817 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) (both notice of intent to accelerate and notice of
acceleration required for proper acceleration and foreclosure).
11. Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. 1982) (notices required but
may be waived in note); Stricklin v. Levine, 750 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
writ dism'd) (note and deed of trust read together effectively waived notice requirements);
Cruce v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 696 S.W.2d 656, 657 (rex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(contractual waiver of notice valid).
12. 768 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ granted).
13. Id at 388.
14. Id at 389.
15. Id. at 390. The author has argued elsewhere that the standards for waiver of the
notice requirements should be raised. See Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 187, 188-90 (1986). Such a drafting requirement would hardly be
an onerous one.
16. 768 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).
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to support a summary judgment.17 Failure to meet this burden raised a gen-
uine issue of material fact requiring trial.'8
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Enforceability and Terms of Sales Contracts
Parol Evidence Admissible to Show Contract was Not Formed. It is funda-
mental hornbook law that no contract is formed if the parties lack contrac-
tual intent.' 9 In King v. Fordice2 ° the court held that adoption of the Code
did not displace this general common law rule of contracts and that parol
evidence was admissible to show that a contract for the sale of an airplane
never came into existence.21 This conclusion is in accord with the view ex-
pressed by numerous commentators on the Code.2
Calculation of Price Section 2.305 of the Code allows a contract to be
formed even if the parties have not agreed on a specific price so long as they
intend to be bound by the contract. 23 A fortiori, the parties can agree on a
price to be fixed in terms of an agreed market, and this price will be enforce-
able if the market continues to operate.24 In Tejas Grain Makers, Ina v.
Cactus Feeders, Ina 25 the court held that a contract calling for the price of
corn to be set by calculation of the monthly average of the daily midpoint of
a specified market constituted a definite price enforceable by the buyer.26
B. Warranties
Warranty of Title. Unless specifically disclaimed, a warranty of good title
exists in every contract for the sale of goods.27 The warranty of title is
breached, not only by an inability on the part of the seller to convey good
title,28 but by a disturbance of the buyer's right to quiet possession of the
17. Id at 465.
18. Id
19. See, eg., P_ ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-207:7 (3d ed. 1981); E.
A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 116 (1982); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 27 (3d ed. 1988).
20. 776 S.W.2d 608 ('rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
21. Id at 612. The precise issue was whether the adoption of a parol evidence rule in
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) was an abrogation of the
common law rule.
22. See, eg., R. ANDERSON, supra note 19, § 2-202: 65; W. HAWKLAND, UCC SERIES
§ 2-202:01 (3d ed. 1986); J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 119.
23. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
24. Id 2.305(a)(3). (Vernon 1968). If the market fails to fix a price, the price is a reason-
able price at the time of delivery. Id.
25. 762 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
26. Id at 737.
27. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312(a), (b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
28. See, eg., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. Dobbs, 743 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1987, writ denied) (breach of warranty resulting from failure to describe accurately land
in timber lease deed); Horta v. Tennison, 671 S.W.2d 720, 723 (rex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, no writ) (breach of warranty resulting from failure to provide certificate of title of
automobile); Mitchell v. Webb, 591 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ)
(breach of warranty resulting from failure to transfer clear title of stolen pickup.
1990]
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goods.29 According to the court in Saulny v. RDY, Inc.,30 however, the war-
ranty of good title was not breached by a seller's failure to deliver a certifi-
cate of title to a boat where the buyer's use of the boat was not affected by
the nondelivery of the title.31 This result was reached even though the seller
did not comply with the certificate of title provisions of the Texas Parks &
Wildlife Code requiring a boat dealer to apply for a certificate of title within
twenty days following sale.32 The court held that the statute did not render
the sale void as between the parties.33
Warranties of Quality. Most of the warranty litigation during the Survey
period centered on alleged breaches of express or implied warranties of qual-
ity. In National Bugmobiles, Inc. v. Jobi Properties34 an extermination com-
pany treated a home for subterranean termites at the request of the original
owner. After sale of the home to the plaintiff, an infestation of drywood
termites was discovered, and the exterminator refused to honor a written
warranty promising retreatment without charge if termites were discovered
after the first treatment. The exterminator argued that the warranty did not
extend to treating an infestation of a different type than that involved in the
original work and that the plaintiff was not a "consumer" for purposes of the
warranty under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)35 because the
plaintiff did not directly seek the services of the defendant exterminator.
The court held that the language of the warranty did not limit retreatment to
particular types of termite infestation and that evidence of the transferability
of the express warranty upon sale of the home made the plaintiff a consumer
for purposes of the DTPA. 36
In Don werth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc. 37 the consumers purchased
a used car after the salesman made representations that the brakes were in
good condition. When the consumers later discovered that the odometer
had been rolled back on the vehicle and that the brakes were seriously worn,
they attempted to resolve the problems by negotiation with the dealer.
When negotiations failed, they drove around the dealership on three consec-
utive Saturdays with a sign on their car reading "BOUGHT THIS CAR
FROM PRESTON II. THE MILES WERE ROLLED BACK. '38 When
the dealer brought an action for defamation, the consumers asserted coun-
terclaims for misrepresentations of the quality of the goods under the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act.39 The supreme court held that the salesman's
29. See Saenz Motors v. Big H. Auto Auction, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1983) (seizure and retention of automobiles by Department of Public Safety breached
warranty even without proof that the automobiles were stolen), aff'd, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.
1984).
30. 760 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
31. Id. at 815.
32. TEx. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 31.046(b), .053(b) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1990).
33. 760 S.W.2d at 815.
34. 773 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
35. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
36. 773 S.W.2d at 621.
37. 775 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1989).
38. Id. at 636.
39. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7) (Vernon 1987) provides that mis-
[Vol. 44
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statements constituted some evidence to support a jury finding that the
dealer had misrepresented the quality of the brakes.40 The more important
part of the opinion, however, is the discussion of the holding by the court of
appeals41 that the evidence did not support a DTPA claim and that the
dealer was entitled to recover attorneys' fees because the action was ground-
less and brought in bad faith. On this issue, the supreme court held that the
action was not groundless because some evidence did support the jury ver-
dict.42 The court further noted, in dictum, that a DTPA action cannot be
found to have been brought for "purposes of harrassment" unless it was
brought for the sole purpose of harrassment.43 The court remanded the case
for further proceedings.44
In Sidco Products Marketing, Ina v. Gulf Oil Corp.45 a disappointed buyer
of "Middle Layer Emulsion," or "MLE," described as "a mixture of oil,
water and particulate matter,"46 sued for breach of express warranties, im-
plied warranties and associated DTPA claims. The court found that no ex-
press warranties were given by the seller and that no implied warranties were
breached when the oil was found to be environmentally hazardous because
the oil was never described as "ordinary slop oil." 47 The court also found
there was no basis for the DTPA claims because the seller made no inaccu-
rate representations about the qualities of the goods.48
In Glockzin v. Rhea4 the court found neither a breach of warranty nor a
DTPA misrepresentation when a truck repair company refused to repair a
truck under an alleged oral warranty because of the owner's failure to pay
for prior repair work, including repairs purportedly covered by the war-
ranty.50 The court noted evidence introduced by the repair company that it
was customary in the trade to refuse repairs when prior work had not been
paid for by the customer and held there was no breach or misrepresentation
of the repair warranty. 51 A dissenting opinion argued that the various repair
contracts were severable and that the failure of the customer to pay the en-
tire account for all repairs should not preclude recovery for any collateral
representation of standard, quality, or grade constitutes a deceptive trade practice. The opin-
ion does not indicate why an express warranty claim was not joined with the DTPA claim; in
actions involving express representations of quality, no essential difference exists in the two
claims.
40. 775 S.W.2d at 636. The odometer claim was not pursued because the rollback appar-
ently occurred when the car was in the hands of a priorowner, and the car dealer did not know
this at the time of sale.
41. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge v. Donwerth, 744 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987),
rev'd, 775 S.W.2d 634 (rex. 1989).
42. 775 S.W.2d at 637.
43. id at 638.
44. id at 639.
45. 858 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. Id at 1097.
47. Id. at 1099. Ordinary slop oil can be processed by ordinary refining processes while
MLE requires special handling and treatment.
48. Id
49. 760 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
50. Id at 668.
51. Id
1990]
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warranty claims.5 2 Oddly enough, neither the majority nor the dissenting
opinions mentioned Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes"3 and the
implied warranty of good and workmanlike service for the repair or modifi-
cation of tangible property created by that decision.54
Implied Warranties Implied warranties arise in transactions for the sale of
goods under sections 2.314 and 2.315 of the Code." Texas case law has also
created implied warranties in other types of transactions.56 Several recent
cases dealt with the scope of these warranties and how burdens of proof
should be allocated in proving breach. In Doe v. Cutter Laboratories57 and
Easterly v. HSP of Texas, Inc. 58 the courts considered arguments that prod-
ucts used in the rendition of medical services are covered by the implied
warranty provisions of the Code. In Doe the products were cryoprecepitat13
and lyophilized plasma derived from blood and blood plasma. The court
cited the provisions contained in section 2.316 of the Texas Code, which
exclude blood, blood plasma or other human tissues from implied warranty
coverage 9 and concluded that products derived from blood and blood
plasma were subject to the same exclusion because they were inherent parts
of a medical service rather than commodities offered for sale.60 In Easterly
the court similarly concluded that a catheter that broke off in a mother's
spine during childbirth related to the rendition of a medical service and not
to the sale of a good.61 Because the primary relationship between the parties
was based on a service rather than the sale of a product, no implied warran-
ties attached to the transaction.62
In the rather bizarre case of Haney v. Purcell Co., Inc 6 3 the purchasers of
a home discovered that their backyard had once been a cemetery. The
supreme court ruled that simply because the area had been abandoned as a
52. Id. at 669 (Hoyt, J., dissenting).
53. 741 S.W.2d 349 (rex. 1987).
54. Id. at 354. In Melody Home the court also held that the implied warranty could not
be waived or disclaimed. Id at 355. It is unfortunate that the court did not address the
question of whether the failure to pay for repairs is a valid defense under Melody Home in light
of the antiwaiver policy.
55. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314-.315 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
56. See, eg., Davidow v. Inwood N. Professional Group-Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.
1988) (implied warranty of suitability in commercial leases); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987) (implied warranty that repairs or modifications of tangible
personal property will be done in a good and workmanlike manner); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568
S.W.2d 658 (rex. 1978) (implied warranty of habitability in residential leasing); Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (rex. 1968) (implied warranty of habitability in sale of dwelling).
57. 703 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
58. 772 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
59. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to
the furnishing of human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissues or organs
from a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs. Such blood,
blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not for the purpose of this Title be consid-
ered commodities subject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical
services.
60. 703 F. Supp. at 574.
61. 772 S.W.2d at 214.
62. Id.
63. 770 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1989).
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cemetery at some time in the past, the purchasers' claims for negligence,
fraud, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty and DTPA
violations were not moot.64 The court remanded the case for consideration
of the other issues raised.65
In Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes66 the supreme court held
that an implied warranty of good and workmanlike service attached to the
repair or modification of tangible property.67 The court also held that this
warranty could not be waived or disclaimed. 68 In Archibald v. Act IIIArabi-
ans69 the court of appeals held that the inability to waive or disclaim this
warranty also meant that the provider of services could not utilize the de-
fenses of assumption of risk or indemnity from the consumer to avoid the
warranty.70 Archibald is the first case to deal with the substantive meaning
of the waiver aspect of the Melody Home opinion.
The most important warranty decision rendered during the Survey period
was Plas-Tex, Ina v. United States Steel Corp.71 In Plas-Tex the supreme
court held that the purchaser of goods who asserted $reach of the implied
warranty of merchantability had to prove that the goods were defective at
the time they left the manufacturer's or seller's possession.72 The court de-
fined "defect" as meaning "a condition of the goods that renders them unfit
for the ordinary purposes for which they are used because of a lack of some-
thing 'necessary for adequacy."' 73 The difficulty of proving a defect under
this test is somewhat ameliorated by the suggestion of the court that circum-
stantial evidence may be used to prove a defect where the plaintiff can show
proper use of the goods together with a malfunction.74
Disclaimers and Statute of Limitations. Disclaimers of warranty are regu-
lated by section 2.316 of the Code." The most fundamental rule stated in
that section is the requirement that a disclaimer must be conspicuous.76 In
Cate v. Dover Corp.77 the court determined that one paragraph in a five-
paragraph advertisement bearing the prominent title "WARRANTY" was
conspicuous and constituted an adequate disclaimer of all implied warran-
ties.78 The dissent disagreed that the single paragraph, which was not set
out from the rest of the text in boldface or other distinguishable type, was
conspicuous. 79 The advertisement itself is reprinted in the text of the opin-
.64. IL at 567.
65. IdM The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, had not reached the other issues
because it regarded them as mooted by the abandonment of the property as a cemetery.
66. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987); see supra note 54.
67. 741 S.W.2d at 354.
68. Id. at 355.
69. 768 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
70. IM. at 828.
71. 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989).
72. Id at 444.
73. Id. n.4.
74. Id at 444-45.
75. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANm. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
76. Id § 2.316(b).
77. 776 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ requested).
78. Id. at 682.
79. Id at 685 (Grant, J., dissenting).
1990]
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ion and provides an interesting way for lawyers to test themselves in judging
whether a disclaimer is conspicuous.80 Apparently, no DTPA misrepresen-
tation claim was alleged as a cause of action in the case.
In American Alloy Steel v. Armco, Inc. 81 a buyer notified a steel seller that
certain steel plate purchased from the seller was defective. The defect was
one that could not be discovered until a buyer attempted to burn and mill
the plate (that is, the defect could not be discovered by a seller who merely
held the plate in inventory without attempting to use it). The seller replaced
the plate and sued the manufacturer for reimbursement. The court held
there was no express indemnity agreement between the manufacturer and
the seller and no indemnity liability should be implied.8 2 The court further
held that any warranty claim by the seller against the manufacturer was
barred by the four-year statute of limitations in section 2.725 of the Code8 3
because more than four years had passed from the time of sale by the manu-
facturer to the seller.8 4
C. Good Faith Purchase
Right of Buyers to Avoid Third-Party Claims Two sections of the Code deal
with the right of a buyer of goods to avoid third-party claims of ownership
or other interests in the goods that are the subject of the transaction." In La
Hacienda Savings Association v. Houston-Gulf Investment Corp. 86 the buyer
of a repossessed aircraft from a leasing company argued that it was either a
buyer in the ordinary course of business or a bona fide purchaser who took
the aircraft free of the outstanding security interest of a third party that had
financed the purchase of the plane by the leasing company. The court held
that the buyer did not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business
because it did not purchase the aircraft from a seller who was in the business
of selling goods of that kind.87 The court also held that the evidence was in
dispute as to whether the buyer had knowledge of the claim of the secured
party and thus would not support summary judgment in favor of the
buyer.88 The court remanded the case for trial.8 9
In Thompson v. Apollo Paint & Body Shop90 the buyer of a used automo-
bile fared better against the claim of a repair shop that it had a mechanic's
lien on the automobile. The seller had possession of both the automobile
and a certificate of title disclosing only a security interest in favor of a bank;
80. Id. at 684. If the majority is correct, the author of this Article flunks the test because
the disclaimer hardly seems conspicuous in his view.
81. 777 S.W.2d 173 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
82. Id. at 176.
83. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
84. 777 S.W.2d at 176.
85. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.403, 9.307 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1990).
86. 759 S.W.2d 195 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
87. Id. at 197. The definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of business appears in
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
88. 759 S.W.2d at 198.
89. Id
90. 768 S.W.2d 373 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
[Vol. 44
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nothing in the documentation or in the circumstances showed that a
mechanic's lien existed. The court held that possession by the repair shop
was essential to foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and that, by giving up pos-
session, the repair shop ran the risk that the automobile would be sold to a
good faith purchaser.91 The court awarded the buyer title and possession of
the automobile as a matter of law. 92
D. Performance Disputes
Revocation of Acceptance. In Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Pierce93 the
Tyler court of appeals carefully analyzed the relationship between the
DTPA,94 the Federal Trade Commission Holder in Due Course Rule,95 and
the right of a buyer to revoke acceptance of goods under the Code.96 The
court stated three principal conclusions: First, the buyers of a mobile home
were entitled to revoke acceptance of the home because of numerous defects
substantially impairing its value to them;97 second, the right to revoke ac-
ceptance was equivalent to the right of rescission allowed under the DTPA
and a pleading that sought to revoke acceptance was adequate as a prayer
for rescission under the DTPA;98 and third, the holder of a consumer credit
contract under the FTC Holder in Due Course Rule was subject to the rem-
edy of rescission and the buyers did not need to prove an amount of actual
damage to obtain cancellation of the contract in the hands of the holder.99
The court also held that the buyers were entitled to the recovery of attor-
ney's fees on its rescission claim, but the holder of the contract was entitled
to an offset for the fair rental value of the home during the time it was in use
by the buyers. 10°
Excused Performance. Under the Code, performance under a contract of
sale may be excused if performance "has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made." 101 The parties to a contract are
free to modify the Code test if they so desire or to adopt other standards for
the determination of a valid excuse for nonperformance. 10 2 In Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co. 103 the parties included a force majeure clause
in their contract that excused performance by a buyer of gas in response to
"any laws, orders, rules, regulations, acts or restraints of any government or
91. Id at 376.
92. Id at 377.
93. 768 S.W.2d 416 (rex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).
94. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1990).
95. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (1989).
96. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
97. 768 S.W.2d at 424. The test of substantial impairment is contained in TEx. Bus. &
CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
98. 768 S.W.2d at 422.
99. Id. at 420.
100. Id at 424-25.
101. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.615 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
102. Id § 2.615(2).
103. 768 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
1990]
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governmental body or authority, civil or military." 104 Because of a change
in rate structure under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No.
380, the buyer substantially reduced its gas purchases. The court held that
the force majeure clause was sufficient to excuse the buyer's performance.10 5
In Texas City Refining, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc 106 the jury found that a delay in
the seller's delivery of crude oil (during which the price fell by approxi-
mately fifty percent) had been caused by bad weather, an event excused by
the force majeure clause. Because the seller's delay was excused under the
terms of the contract, the buyer was not relieved from the obligation to ac-
cept delivery when the goods finally arrived. 107
E. Remedies
Difference Between Contract Price and Market Price. Under section 2.708 of
the Code, the measure of damages for nonacceptance by a buyer is the differ-
ence between the market price at the time and place for tender and the un-
paid contract price. 108 In Everspring Enterprises v. Bunge Edible Oil 109 the
court held that proof of the difference in value of crude soybean oil was not
relevant to prove the difference in value of a finished product manufactured
in part from the crude oil.110 Because of the failure to plead and prove the
proper measure of damages, the seller was denied recovery for the buyer's
failure to take delivery. 11
Buyer's Security Interest in Delivered Goods. Section 2.711 of the Code gives
the buyer a right to cancel if goods are nonconforming and also creates a
security interest in goods in the possession of the buyer to the extent of any
payments made on their price and for expenses incurred in the care and
custody of the goods."12 The secured buyer is entitled to sell the goods in an
attempt to realize on its security interest."13 In Aztec Corp. v. Tubular Steel,
Inc. 114 and Oil Country Specialists, Ltd. v. Phillipp Bros. 115 buyers of oil field
pipe attempted to use this security interest to secure payments made against
the price. In Aztec the attempt was successful even though the buyer was
unable to sell the goods in realization of its security interest.16 The court
held that a buyer who was unsuccessful in selling the goods could not be
charged with the value of the goods as an offset to the recovery of damages
against the seller." 17 In Oil Country Specialists the court of appeals held that
104. Id. at 780.
105. Id. at 783.
106. 767 S.W.2d 183 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
107. Id. at 186.
108. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(a) (Tex. UCC (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
109. 776 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
110. Id. at 319.
111. Id.
112. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.711(a), (c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
113. Id.
114. 758 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
115. 762 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988), aff'd in part, modified in part
- S.W.2d -, 1990 WL 2738 (Tex. 1989).
116. 758 S.W.2d at 799.
117. Id. at 800.
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evidence supported a jury finding that the buyer had acted in bad faith in
rejecting an entire inventory of pipe delivered by the seller." 8s The failure to
make a good faith rejection prevented the buyer from cancelling under the
terms of section 2.711.119 The court also found, however, that the seller had
breached the contract by delivering defective pipe; this breach terminated
any liability of the buyer to pay restocking fees. 120 The buyer had previously
obtained a standby letter of credit in favor of the seller as beneficiary to pay
the restocking fees if the buyer defaulted in making such payment, and the
court of appeals enjoined the seller from making a presentment under the
credit because of the seller's breach.121 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals on the letter of credit issue, noting that a letter of credit
is an independent contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary.122
The court held that a breach of contract by the beneficiary was not
equivalent to the fraud in the transaction required to justify an injunction
against honor of a letter of credit.123
Damages for Breach of Warranty. The usual, but not exclusive, measure of
damages for a breach of warranty is the difference between the value of the
goods as represented and the value of the goods as actually delivered.12 4 In
Pontiac v. Elliott 125 the court determined that the evidence was insufficient
to prove that the goods as delivered were completely worthless. 126 There
was some evidence, however, tending to show a difference between the value
of the goods as delivered and the value of the goods as represented.127 The
court remanded the case for a new trial.' 2 8 In Ortiz v. Flintkote Co. 129 the
court held that cost of repair was a proper alternative measure of damages
where a contractor had incorporated the goods into the construction of
houses. 130 The court approved this measure even though the contractor had
already sold the houses and any money judgment awarded on this basis
would not actually be used to make repairs. 131




122. - $.W.2d -, 1990 WL 2738 ('ex. 1989).
123. Ia TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990)
allows an injunction against honor if there is fraud in the underlying transaction between the
beneficiary and the account party.
124. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.714 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see also W.O.
Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (rex. 1988) (common law measure of
actual damage for breach of contract is difference between value of goods as represented and
that of goods delivered).
125. 775 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
126. Id at 400.
127. Id.
128. IA at 401.
129. 761 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
130. Id at 536. In Ludt v. McCollum, 762 S.W.2d 575, 576 (rex. 1988), the court noted
that cost of repair could be combined with an amount allowed for the permanent reduction in
market value of a residence after repair; special issues must be submitted on both cost of repair
and reduction in value after repairs are made.
131. 761 S.W.2d at 536.
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Limitation of Liability Clause& A limitation of liability clause was upheld in
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. American National Petroleum Co. 2
under section 2.719 of the Code133 in a commercial context involving the
sale of natural gas.134 Although the court was willing to hold an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing governed performance of the con-
tract, the court also held that a breach of this covenant would be contractual
only and, absent a finding of an independent tort with accompanying actual
damage, exemplary damages could not be awarded. 135 In Southwestern Bell
Telephone v. Delanney 136 the majority refused to enforce a limitation of lia-
bility clause where the action was based on the theory of negligent perform-
ance of contract rather than on simple breach of contract. 137 In addition to
the majority opinion, both a concurrence and a dissent appear in Delan-
ney.138 Between the three opinions, the case contains a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the theory of negligent performance of contract.
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Burdens of Proof
Evidence of Defense Required to Avoid Summary Judgment Under section
3.307 of the Code, production of an instrument entitles the holder to recover
on it unless the defendant establishes a defense. 139 Mere conclusory allega-
tions are insufficient to establish a defense; the defendant must support each
element of an alleged defense by evidence that would be admissible at trial to
show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.140 Under some cir-
cumstances a defense may appear in the record as a matter of law, as when a
prepayment penalty has been assessed when a note has been accelerated. 141
In such cases the appellate court can rule on the issue directly.' 42 In other
circumstances the court must determine if an alleged defense has been prop-
erly supported by admissible evidence. 143
The failure to support an alleged defense with admissible evidence can be
hazardous for a defendant. In two cases Texas courts assessed damage
awards against the defendants for taking nonmeritorious appeals from ad-
verse rulings on summary judgment motions where evidence did not support
the alleged defenses. 1'
132. 763 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ granted).
133. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
134. 763 S.W.2d at 817.
135. Id. at 820.
136. 762 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ granted).
137. Id. at 775.
138. Id at 777. (Cornelius, C.J., concurring); Id. at 777-81 (Grant, ., dissenting).
139. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
140. Hooper v. Mercantile Bank & Trust, 762 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1988, no writ).
141. Texas Airfinance Corp. v. Lesikar, 777 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ).
142. Id
143. Id. at 563-64.
144. Hill v. Thompson & Knight, 756 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)
(damages of $1,500 awarded on appeal); Trans-Continental Finance Corp. v. Summit Nat'l
[Vol. 44
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Federal law also requires that a person who might be liable on an instru-
ment raise a genuine issue of material fact to avoid an adverse ruling on a
motion to enforce the instrument by summary judgment.145 In litigation
involving the FDIC, this requirement can be an even greater burden than
under state law because some defenses that might be available against a
state-law noteholder are cut off by the rights of the FDIC in its receivership
or in its corporate capacities. 146 Such defenses include failure of considera-
tion, fraud in the inducement, and misrepresentation.1 47 If a defendant can
establish, however, that the alleged defense appeared in the minutes of the
board of directors of an insolvent bank,148 or if the defense amounts to fraud
in the factum, a motion for summary judgment in favor of the FDIC may be
avoided. 149
B. Liability of Parties
Liability of Guarantors In Ford v. Darwin 150 the guarantors under a non-
negotiable "Promissory Note Agreement" argued that the plaintiff was re-
quired either to join the principal obligor or to prove that the obligor was
actually or notoriously insolvent. 151 Thb court noted that the word "guaran-
tee," used without qualification, is a guaranty of payment and not merely a
guaranty of collection under section 3.416 of the Code.152 In this case,
though, the agreement was entirely outside the Code rules governing instru-
ments because the agreement included a promise by the borrower to sell
stock to the lender. 153 The court did not regard this circumstance as con-
Bank, 761 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ) (damages of $5,000
awarded on appeal). The authority of the appellate court to award damages as a sanction for a
nonmeritorious appeal is derived from TEX. R. APP. P. 84.
145. FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988).
146. The special status of the FDIC to defeat certain defenses in its receivership capacity
was established in D'Oench Dulune & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), and reaffirmed in
FDIC v. Langley, 484 U.S. 86 (1987). The special status of the FDIC in its corporate capacity
results from the codification of the D'Oench Duhme decision in 12 U.S.C. § 1812 (1988).
147. See, eg., FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1372 (5th Cir.
1988) (defense of misrepresentation); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1986)
(defenses of failure of consideration and fraud in the inducement). These defenses are some-
times called "personal defenses." During the Survey period, in RSR Properties, Inc. v. FDIC,
706 F. Supp. 524, 533 (W.D. Tex. 1989), the court applied these rules to uphold a summary
judgment in favor of the FDIC.
148. For example, an agreement that extended the time to repay a loan. Defenses shown in
the minutes are permitted under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
149. Jack Parker Indus. v. FDIC, 769 S.W.2d 700 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ). In
FDIC v. Langley, 484 U.S. 86 (1987), the Supreme Court noted in dictum that a fraud in the
factum defense could be raised against the FDIC. Id. at 93-95.
150. 767 S.W.2d 851 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
151. Id. at 853. In Code terms, this would be an argument that the guarantee was a guar-
antee of collection. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(b) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
152. 767 S.W.2d at 854. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(c) ('ex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
153. 767 S.W.2d at 854-55. Even though an instrument is non-negotiable because it is not
payable to order or to bearer, it is still within the negotiable instrument rules of the Code and
would be subject to Tax. BUs. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See
Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. 1976); TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 3.805 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). If an instrument is non-negotiable for
some other reason, such as the inclusion of a prohibited promise, it is entirely outside the
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trolling, however, and held that a guarantor of payment on a non-Code in-
strument has the same obligations as the guarantor of payment on a Code
instrument. 154
Liability ofAssignees. The question of whether the assignee of a credit con-
tract may be vicariously liable to the debtor because the assignee and as-
signor are "inextricably intertwined" has been the subject of considerable
litigation in Texas.' 5 5 In Qantel Business System v. Custom Controls Co. '5 6
the supreme court seems to have settled the issue of vicarious liability by
holding that the inextricably intertwined doctrine does not create a new the-
ory of liability and that an assignee must have committed an independent
wrong to be held liable to the debtor.' 5 7 Proof that an assignee is inter-
twined with an assignor is only relevant to show that the debtor qualifies as a
"consumer" with respect to the assignee for purposes of possible Deceptive
Trade Practices Act liability; it does not dispense with the need to show the
commission of a deceptive act by the assignee.158 The court reached the
same result in Briercroft Service Corp. v. De Los Santos, 15 9 a case involving
the Federal Trade Commission "holder in due course rule."'' 6 The court
also noted that, under the FTC rule, the assignee was not liable to the debtor
beyond the amount paid under the contract; because nothing had been paid
under the contract, the assignee would not be liable in any event even if a
violation by the assignor had occurred.' 61
Liability of Issuer of Travelers' Checks. In Thomas C. Cook, Inc v.
Code. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (standard of per-
formance governs parties).
154. 767 S.W.2d at 855. On this point, the Court said:
We are persuaded that section 3.416(a) of the Texas UCC correctly reflects the
present law regarding guaranties of payment of both UCC and non-UCC instru-
ments. Regardless of the UCC or non-UCC nature of the underlying instru-
ment, a guarantor performs the identical function and should assume the
identical obligations. We find no rational basis for the argument that a guaran-
tor of payment of a non-UCC instrument has different rights and liabilities than
a guarantor of payment -of a UCC instrument.
Id at 855.
155. See, eg., Qantel Business Sys. v. Custom Controls, 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988)
("inextricably intertwined" does not create vicarious liability under DTPA); Home Say. Ass'n
v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987) (DTPA inapplicable where facts do not support
"inextricable intertwining"); Briercroft Serv. Corp. v. De Los Santos, 776 S.W.2d 198, 206
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (insubstantial evidence of "inextricable intertwin-
ing" creates no vicarious liability); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Kinerd, 733 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.
App.-Eastand 1987, writ granted) ("inextricable intertwining" establishes standing to sue
under DTPA).
156. 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
157. M. at 305.
158. Id.
159. 776 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
160. The Federal Trade Commission "holder in due course rule" requires that a consumer
credit contract contain a conspicuous notice that any holder of the contract is subject to all
claims and defenses that the debtor could raise against the original assignor. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 433.1-.3 (1989).
161. 776 S.W.2d at 205. The Texas Supreme Court had previously held that an assignee
was liable only to the extent of payments made under a contract containing the FTC notice.
Home Say. Ass'n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987).
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Rowhaniar1 62 the El Paso court of appeals again considered the liability of
an issuer to the owner of lost travelers' checks. 163 In a careful analysis of the
Code rules as applied to travelers' checks, the court concluded that such
checks are negotiable instruments under the Code.164 A purchaser of travel-
ers' checks could also be a "consumer" of services for purposes of the De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act because the issuer guarantees replacement of
lost checks.165 In Rowhanian, however, the owner testified that the checks,
when lost, already contained the signature and countersignature of the origi-
nal purchaser. Because the checks had already been countersigned, the
owner was merely the holder of bearer instruments and not a consumer vis-
a-vis the issuer.166 Under these circumstances, the court said it would be
"unreasonable to require replacement."1 67 The issuer had nevertheless
agreed to replace the checks if the holder would sign an indemnity agree-
ment to cover the lost checks if they should ever be presented for pay-
ment. 168 The court allowed recovery for the face amount of the instruments
and partial prejudgment interest.1 69
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. Payment of Instruments
Liability of Payor Banks for Payment Over a Forged Indorsement According
to section 3.419 of the Code, an instrument is converted when it is paid on a
forged indorsement.1 70 In Interfirst Bank v. Pioneer Concrete171 the court
considered whether a payor bank that pays an instrument on a forged in-
dorsement is entitled to utilize the defense that it acted in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards in making the payment
and no longer has funds represented by the instrument remaining in its
hands.172 The court termed this an issue of first impression in Texas and
noted that only one other case 1"3 in the United States had addressed the
question. 17 4 The court correctly held that a payor bank stands in a different
162. 774 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
163. The court had previously addressed this issue in Thomas C. Cook, Inc. v. Rowhanian,
700 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where it reversed and re-
manded for a new trial.
164. 774 S.W.2d at 682.
165. Id at 683.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Compare TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.804 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) allowing
recovery on lost instruments upon indemnity against loss by reason of further claims on the
instruments. Failing agreement with the issuer, the owner could have asserted rights under
this section as an alternative to the indemnity agreement.
169. 774 S.W.2d at 686. Only partial prejudgment interest was allowed because of the
failure of the owner to file suit on the correct legal theory in the first trial and appeal. Interest
was suspended from the time of the first filing until judgment in the first appeal.
170. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(a)(3) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
171. 761 S.W.2d 857 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
172. This defense appears in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(c) (rex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
173. United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 17 U. C. C. Rep. Serv. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
174. 761 S.W.2d at 858.
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relationship to the owner of an item than does a collecting bank since a
payor is not an agent of the owner, but rather is acting on behalf of the
depositor who drew the cleck.175 It would make little sense for the statute
to impose liability on a payor for payment of a check over a forged indorse-
ment and to then excuse that liability if the payor no longer has the funds
represented by the check. This would, in effect, excuse virtually every pay-
ment on a forged indorsement and make conversion liability meaningless.
The court properly rejected the defense asserted in this case,1 7 6 which simply
misconstrued the payment structure of articles 3 and 4 of the Code.
Liability for Failure to Verify Drawer's Signature. A payor bank that pays
items over the forged signature of its customer is generally required to
recredit its customer's account unless the payor can establish that the cus-
tomer failed to act with reasonable promptness to notify the payor of forger-
ies on the account.1 77 The customer may avoid this duty, however, if it can
be shown that the bank itself failed to exercise ordinary care in paying the
items. 1 78 While the issue of ordinary care is usually an issue of fact, extreme
circumstances may permit the court to treat it as a matter of law. Such
circumstances occurred in McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union,179
where witnesses for the payor testified that it had no procedure for the verifi-
cation of signatures on share drafts drawn on accounts maintained at the
payor credit union and that this was standard practice in the credit union
industry. One witness testified that general industry usage did not even re-
quire that share drafts be signed before they were paid. Faced with this
rather remarkable testimony,180 the court held that, as a matter of law, the
failure to have any procedure to verify signatures was "unreasonable, arbi-
trary, and unfair."181 Despite a delay by the customers in giving notice of
forgeries on their account, the payor was held liable for the amount of the
forgeries because of its failure to exercise ordinary care.182
Time Allowed for Payment or Return of Items. One of the underlying poli-
cies of article 4 of the Code is to promote speed in the check collection pro-
cess. This is accomplished in large part by the imposition of strict time
limits for the collection and payment of items by collecting and payor
175. Id. at 859.
176. Id.
177. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
178. Id. To similar effect, see d. § 3.406, but under this section the payor has the burden
of proving ordinary care.
179. 772 S.W.2d 183 (fex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
180. The court stated:
After an exhaustive search, we have found no cases directly on point nor have
the parties cited any cases directly on point. Of the published opinions that deal
with similar issues, each case involves a situation where the bank employed some
method of signature verification on some of the checks passing through the
bank.... In the instant case, there was no evidence that any process was used
to verify signatures on any of the share drafts.
Id. at 189-90 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
181. Id. at 189.
182. Id at 193.
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banks.'8 3 In the case of a payor bank, a decision to pay or return must be
made by midnight of the day following the day of receipt of an item, a time
period referred to as the "midnight deadline."'" In Pulaski Bank & Trust v.
Texas American Bank 85 the issue was whether an item was returned by the
midnight deadline where the presenting bank and the payor bank were both
owned by the same holding company and where both banks cleared checks
through a data processing center that was also owned by the holding com-
pany. After a careful review of the collection and payment rules of article 4,
the court held that each bank was entitled to be regarded as a separate cor-
porate entity for purposes of determining the time for the processing of
checks. 18 6 Based on the separate status of each bank, the court held that the
payor bank had made a timely return of the check through the data process-
ing center to the presenting bank and was not liable for a late return.18 7 The
presenting bank, however, breached its duty of ordinary care in returning
the item by misrouting it, thereby delaying receipt of notice of dishonor by
the depositary bank that had initiated the collection. 88 The measure of
damages for breach of the duty of ordinary care by a collecting bank is the
face amount of the item reduced by an amount that could not have been
realized by the use of ordinary care. 189 The court found that the depositary
bank could have mitigated its damages by freezing its depositor's account
instead of allowing further withdrawals when it belatedly learned of the dis-
honor and could thus have avoided all but some $8,202.14 in damages.' 90
The Pulaski case is important for its careful application of article 4 to mod-
em check clearings through jointly owned data processing centers and settles
critical issues of timing for purposes of check payment. Although the court
carefully noted that no evidence indicated that the banks engaged in a fraud-
ulent or sham arrangement designed to extend the time for processing
checks or to avoid liability for late returns, the court did suggest that such
evidence would represent a limit on the use of joint processing centers by
affiliated banks.191
183. The time limit for collecting banks is midnight of the day following the day an item is
received. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.202(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The time
limit for payor banks is midnight of the day of receipt for settlement, TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. § 4.301(a), and midnight of the day following the day of receipt for payment, id.
§§ 4.301(a), 4.302(1).
184. Id § 4.104(a)(8).
185. 759 S.W.2d 723 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
186. 759 S.W.2d at 731; see Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968) (branch banks to be treated as separate banks for clearing purposes).
187. Liability for a late return amounts to accountability for the face amount of the item.
Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see, eg., Hamby Co. v.
Seminole State Bank, 652 S.W.2d 939 (rex. 1983); Pecos County State Bank v. El Paso Live-
stock Auction Co., 586 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
188. 759 S.W.2d at 734.
189. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(e) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
190. 759 S.W.2d at 736.




Setoffs and the Duty of Good Faith. In Plaza National Bank v. Walker192 the
court upheld both lack of good faith and Deceptive Trade Practice claims
against a bank for the exercise of a wrongful setoff.193 The court awarded
actual damages of $300 and $100 dollars to each of two savings account
depositors and exemplary damages of $20,000, remitted to $10,000 on ap-
peal. 194 The opinion contains little discussion of rationale, but the court
states two holdings of potential importance. First, citing Arnold v. National
County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 195 the court ruled that a relationship be-
tween a bank and a depositor is a "special relationship" creating a duty of
good faith and fair dealing that was breached by the bank. 196 The opinion,
however, does not discuss precisely how the bank breached this duty. Sec-
ond, citing Riverside National Bank v. Lewis, 197 the court held that a deposi-
tor who maintains a savings account with a bank seeks more than an
extension of credit; the depositor also seeks services associated with the ac-
count, and thus qualifies as a "consumer" under the DTPA.198 Here again,
however, the opinion does not explain how the bank violated the DTPA.
The opinion offers virtually no guidance about the particular acts by the
bank that resulted in a determination of liability, yet the holding expands
both the duty of good faith and fair dealing and the concept of consumer
under the DTPA.
In contrast to Plaza National Bank, the court in Pennzoil Co. v. Southwest
Bank of San Angelo 199 held that a bank properly exercised a right of setoff
where a third party deposited funds in a customer's general account without
any instruction by the customer to hold them in trust.20° Because of a fail-
ure to prove that the bank knew or should have known that the funds were
to be held in trust, the setoff was proper and the bank was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. 20
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
Issues of Interpretation. The ordinary rules of contract interpretation are
applicable to letters of credit,20 2 and the question of interpretation is a ques-
tion of law for the court.203 Thus, in case of ambiguity, a letter of credit is
construed against the drafter, and an interpretation that renders perform-
192. 767 S.W.2d 276 (Trex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
193. Id. at 278.
194. Id.
195. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
196. 767 S.W.2d at 278.
197. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
198. 767 S.W.2d at 278. The term "consumer" is defined in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
199. 775 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
200. Id at 460.
201. Id
202. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. 1979).




ance possible is preferred to one that makes performance impossible.204 In
Universal Savings Association v. Killeen Savings & Loan 205 the court applied
these principles to determine that a reference in a letter of credit to the un-
derlying contract was a general reference only and did not create conditions
precedent to the issuer's liability on the credit.20 6 In the view of the court,
more than a general reference to the underlying contract should have been
included in the credit if the issuer intended to condition its liability; lacking
express conditions, the court preferred an interpretation that made perform-
ance possible under the terms of the credit.207
In a case involving a different type of interpretation issue, the Texas
Supreme Court declined to answer a certified question by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals concerning the proper interpretation of Texas law as ap-
plied to a letter of credit that contained an October 31, 1981, date for pre-
sentment of documents, but also stated that it covered a contract to be
performed between September and December 1981.208 Due to the lack of
Texas Supreme Court guidance, the Fifth Circuit interpreted previous state
appellate court cases to conclude that the date in the letter of credit controls
over the expiration date.209 In Kerr Construction Co. v. Plains National
Bank 210 the Amarillo court of appeals had addressed a similar issue and had
concluded there was an irreconcilable conflict between the stated expiry date
and the date for contract performance. 21' In Kerr the court held that the
contract date was the most important provision in the letter of credit and
that the beneficiary could draw against the credit under the longer perform-
ance date even though it extended beyond the expiry date.212 Professing
itself "unable to determine" whether Kerr correctly states Texas law because
of the interaction between rule 90 and rule 133 of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, the Fifth Circuit certified the question to the Texas Supreme
Court.213
The confusion as to whether Kerr correctly states Texas law arose because
of the denial of a writ of error in Kerr, at that time an unpublished decision,
and the subsequent publication of Kerr, not by the Texas Supreme Court as
part of its writ denial, but by the Amarillo court of appeals. 214 This se-
quence of events led the Fifth Circuit to note, "it is not clear whether or not
204. Id; Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 798 (rex. 1984).
205. 757 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, no writ).
206. id at 76.
207. Id.
208. Exxon Co. v. Banque De Paris et des Pays-Bas, 867 F.2d 1524, ques. certified, 874
F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1989), answer to question certified and conformed, 889 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.
1989).
209. 889 F.2d 674, 675 (5th Cir. 1989).
210. 753 S.W.2d 181 (rex: App.-Amarillo 1987, writ denied).
211. Id. at 184.
212. I
213. 867 F.2d at 1526. TEX. R. APP. P. 133 describes the effect of a "writ refused"
designation (connoting that the lower court opinion is correct) and the effect of a "writ de-
nied" designation (connoting an error of law in the lower court opinion, but not one so serious
as to require reversal). TEX. R. APP. P. 90 provides, in part, that unpublished opinions can-
not be cited as authority by the courts or by counsel.
214. 867 F.2d at 1526.
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the Texas Supreme Court would consider Kerr a proper elaboration of Texas
law on letters of credit. ' '215 The refusal by the Texas Supreme court to ac-
cept certification of the question prompted the Fifth Circuit to follow Kerr as
precedential authority.216
In yet another variation on the interpretation theme, the court found itself
unable even to read some of the critical documents presented by an advising
bank under a letter of credit because they were written in Chinese.217
Although the facts indicated that the advising bank had taken a draft drawn
under the letter of credit in good faith and without notice that an accompa-
nying purchase order had been forged, two "certificates of negotiation" con-
stituted the only proof that value had been given for the draft. Despite the
forgery, the advising bank could not qualify as a holder in due course of the
draft entitled to payment under the credit without proof of value.218 The
trial court had excluded proof of the contents of the Chinese documents by
an oral translation because no written translation was offered. The court of
appeals permitted oral translation, particularly since the primary use was to
explain the meaning of arabic numbers contained in the documents and
these were the relevant portions of the documents to prove the giving of
value.219
Issues of Presentment. Upon presentment of documents under a letter of
credit, the beneficiary warrants that the documents comply with the credit
and meet the necessary conditions to draw under the credit.220 In Artoc
Bank & Trust v. Sun Marine Terminals, Inc. 221 the court held that the bene-
ficiary breached this warranty by presenting an invoice purporting to cover
services already rendered to the account party by the beneficiary when such
services had not actually been performed. 222 The court rejected an argu-
ment by the beneficiary that it was entitled to payment because the invoiced
amount represented part of the accelerated balance due under a lease agree-
ment following default by the account party.223
A common issue in letter of credit litigation is whether the beneficiary has
strictly complied with the terms of the credit in making a presentment for
payment under the credit.224 Resolution of this issue often depends on the
construction of terms used in the letter of credit, and Employers Mutual
Casualty v. Tascosa National Bank 225 is no exception. The letter of credit in
215. Id.
216. 889 F.2d at 674.
217. Internat'l Commercial Bank v. Hall-Fuston Corp., 767 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1989, no writ).
218. A holder in due course of a draft drawn under a letter of credit is entitled to receive
payment from the issuer even though a required document is forged. TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 5.114(b)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
219. 767 S.W.2d at 261.
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.11l(a) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
221. 760 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ granted).
222. IM at 314.
223. I
224. See, e.g., Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Say. Ass'n, 696 S.W.2d 378, 382
(Tex. 1985); Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1984).
225. 767 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied).
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dispute required the beneficiary to provide a "written certification" of cer-
tain events as part of the presentment.226 The beneficiary provided a written
statement describing the events, but did not use the word "certify" or "certi-
fication" in the statement. The issuer refused to pay on the ground that the
documents did not strictly comply with the terms of the credit. The court
held it would be a redundancy for a written document asserting the existence
of a fact to be required to denominate itself as a written certification of that
fact when the meaning of the term "certify" means to authenticate in writ-
ing.227 The court was unwilling to find that such redundancy was intended
absent a clear expression of that intent by the issuer who had drafted the
document. 228
VI. INv rMENT SECURITIES
Perfection of Security Interest in Stock Certificates. In FDIC v. W. Hugh
Meyer & Associates, Inc. 229 stock pledged to a bank and subsequently 'ac-
quired by the FDIC did not give the FDIC a secured claim to a separate
stock dividend certificate where the bank never received the dividend certifi-
cate and where neither the bank nor the FDIC ever registered the holding of
the originally pledged stock nor timely filed a stop transfer form. Because
possession is essential to obtain a security interest in a certificated security, a
law firm holding the stock dividend certificate as security for a legal retainer
had priority in the dividend certificate up to the amount of its retainer.230
Enforcement of Judgments Against Securities. Article 8 of the Code strongly
distinguishes between certificated and uncertificated securities.231 A critical
difference between the two types of securities is that the certificated security
requires a creditor to obtain effective physical control of the security to en-
force a judgment, while an uncertificated security requires only a proper
court order directed to the issuer.232 A primary reason for this difference in
treatment is the need to protect possible subsequent bona fide purchasers; if
the certificated security cannot be brought within the control of the court, a
bona fide purchaser may buy the certificate without knowing that a prior
court order affected ownership rights. In Detox Industries, Inc. v. Gullett233
this concern led the court to conclude properly that it could not enter an
order against the issuer of a certificated security to cancel the old certificate
and issue a new one when a possibility existed that the holder of the certifi-
cated security, who did not appear before the court, might subsequently
transfer the certificate to a bona fide purchaser. 234
226. Id at 281.
227. Id at 282.
228. Id
229. 864 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1989).
230. Id at 375.
231. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.102(a)l, (a)(2) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 &
Supp. 1990).
232. Id § 8.317(f).
233. 770 S.W.2d 954 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).




A. Creation and Attachment of a Security Interest
Form of Security Agreement. To create a valid security interest under article
9, (1) a written security agreement signed by the debtor must exist or the
secured party must have possession of the collateral, (2) the secured party
must give value, and (3) the debtor must have rights in the collateral.235
When all three of these elements occur, the security interest attaches to the
collateral.236 While it is often easy to determine if the debtor has signed a
written security agreement, the inquiry is sometimes more complex. In In re
Maddox237 the court applied the composite document rule to find that, even
though no single writing constituted a security agreement, the existence of a
filed financing statement along with other written documents constituted
sufficient evidence to show that a security agreement existed between the
parties.233 In reaching this decision, the court distinguished239 the case of
Mosley v. Dallas Entertainment Co.,240 in which the court held that a financ-
ing statement did not sufficiently qualify as a security agreement. 24' In Mos-
ley the financing statement did not contain any language granting a security
interest and there were no other supporting documents to evidence an agree-
ment to create a security interest.
In In re Hardage242 the court found that a sales slip stating, "I agree that
Sears retains a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the
merchandise purchased until fully paid"243 was sufficient to create a security
interest in the goods sold and identified on the sales slip.244 In a carefully
reasoned opinion, however, the court also found that the secured party had
failed to introduce any evidence of the terms for repayment of the indebted-
ness.245 The secured party could not, therefore, enforce the security interest
in the claimed amount without proof that payment of the outstanding bal-
ance was due.246
Rights in the Collateral. An important issue affecting the creation of a valid
security interest is whether the debtor has sufficient rights in the collateral to
permit attachment of a security interest. In Crocker National Bank v. Ideco
Division of Dresser Industries247 the debtor received a shipment of goods
from a seller with delivery being made to an inventory storage facility used
jointly by the debtor and an affiliate. Prior to the delivery, the debtor and
the affiliate made a contract for sale of the goods to the affiliate, but the
235. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
236. Id.
237. 92 Bankr. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
238. Id. at 713.
239. Id. at 711.
240. 496 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ dism'd).
241. Id. at 240.
242. 99 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
243. Id at 739.
244. Id. at 742.
245. Id
246. Id.
247. 889 F.2d 1452 (5th Cir. 1989).
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affiliate never actually received use of the goods. The seller, who had not
been paid, later accepted return of the goods for full credit on the price,
thereby cancelling the debt. A secured creditor holding a perfected security
interest in the debtor's after-acquired inventory sued the seller for conver-
sion, claiming priority in the goods over the unpaid seller. The debtor subse-
quently filed for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code248
and intervened in the conversion action seeking redelivery of the goods from
the seller. The district court held that the debtor never acquired sufficient
rights in the goods to permit attachment of the security interest because they
had been delivered to a facility used jointly by the debtor and its affiliate and
the affiliate, under the sales contract with the debtor, was the entity that had
rights in the goods.249 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the sales
contract between the debtor and its affiliate did not effectively pass title to
the goods to the affiliate where the affiliate never made a payment nor used
the goods. The court regarded the return of the goods by the debtor as
important evidence that no sale had actually occurred and that the debtor
still retained title to the goods. 250 The possessory interest of the debtor per-
mitted attachment of the security interest, thereby allowing entry of a judg-
ment in favor of the secured party on its conversion claim against the
seller.251
The issue of rights in the collateral can also become entangled with ques-
tions of the authority of an agent to pledge certain collateral under a security
agreement. In Tripp Village Joint Venture v. MBank Lincoln Centre252 a
joint venture agreement specifically vested authority in the manager of a
joint venture to sign documents on behalf of the joint venture. Documents
executed by the manager in favor of a third party created "conclusive evi-
dence" that the document was authorized. 25 3 The manager, who was also
part-owner of a real estate management firm, borrowed money for his firm
by pledging a certificate of deposit owned by the joint venture as collateral
for the loan. The court held that the joint venture agreement gave the man-
ager power to use property owned by the joint venture as collateral for a loan
made to the manager's firm.254 The court also rejected parol evidence of-
fered to avoid the security agreement on the principal theory that the joint
venture agreement represented conclusive evidence of the authority of the
manager to enter into agreements using collateral owned by the joint
venture.255
A third question that can arise in determining whether a debtor's rights in
the collateral will permit attachment of a security interest is whether the
248. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
249. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Ideco Div. of Dresser Indus., 702 F. Supp. 615, 616 (S.D. Tex.
1988), rev'd, 889 F.2d 1452 (5th Cir. 1989).
250. 889 F.2d at 1453.
251. Id at 1454.
252. 774 S.W.2d 746 (rex. App.-Dalas 1989, writ denied).
253. Id at 748.
254. Id at 751.
255. Id at 749, 750, 751.
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transaction is within the scope of article 9.256 In Matter of Nix 257 the court
held that a bankruptcy debtor's Keogh retirement plan was a general intan-
gible in which a valid security interest could be created.2 s Although article
9 excludes security interests in deposit accounts from its scope,259 the court
distinguished a Keogh plan from a deposit account because of the limitations
on the ability of the owner to withdraw funds under the plan prior to
retirement.260
Security Interest of a Collecting Bank While most secured transactions are
created under article 9, in a few instances security interests can arise by oper-
ation of law under another article of the Code.261 One such instance is the
security interest of a collecting bank in an item and accompanying docu-
ments when the collecting bank has advanced funds against the item while it
is still in the process of collection. 262 In In re CM. Turtur Investments,
Inc. 263 a collecting bank advanced funds to its customer against a sight draft
deposited with it for collection. The bank's customer, a car dealer, was en-
gaged in a "dealer trade" of designated automobiles with another car dealer.
The draft, drawn by the customer, named the other dealer as drawee and
was accompanied by several manufacturer's statements of origin and related
certificates of title indorsed in favor of the drawee. The dealer trade fell
through and the drawee refused to pay the sight draft. The collecting bank
asserted a security interest in the draft and in the accompanying statements
of origin and certificates of title. The court held that the security interest of
a collecting bank in "documents" under section 4.208 of the Code26 is lim-
ited to a security interest in "documents of title," such as bills of lading and
warehouse receipts, and does not extend to statements of origin and certifi-
cates of title.265 The court also held that the bank could not qualify as a
holder in due course of the certificates of title because the certificates had
already been indorsed over to the purchasing car dealer. 266 Judgment was
entered in favor of another secured creditor holding a perfected security in-
terest in the customer's inventory. 267 In dictum, the court rejected the the-
ory advanced by the bankruptcy court that the intent of the parties was
256. Article 9 excludes certain types of transactions. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990). The reasons for exclusion range from fed-
eral preemption (e.g., rights in copyrights or patents), to areas traditionally regulated by other
law (e.g., real estate or landlord's liens), to collateral that is not generally commercial in nature
(e.g., insurance claims or judgments).
257. 864 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1989).
258. Id at 1212.
259. See TEx. Bus. & CaM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(12) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1990).
260. Keogh plans are regulated by 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) and are subject
to a penalty tax if early withdrawals are made.
261. See, eg., TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.71 l(c), 4.208(a), 8.321(c) (rex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
262. Id. § 4.208(a).
263. 883 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1989).
264. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.208(a) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
265. 883 F.2d at 38.




controlling on the issue of whether a security interest was created. 268
B. Security Interests in Proceeds
PIK Payments as Proceeds of Collateral. In Sweetwater Production Credit
Association v. O'Briant269 the Texas supreme court held that "Payments In
Kind" (PIK payments) are proceeds of crops and that a perfected security
interest in crops will also cover PIK payments received by a farmer.270
Whether the decision is correct is less important than that the issue is now
settled under Texas law.27 1
C Priorities
Security Interests v. Mechanics' Liens. Article 9 does not attempt to deal
with mechanics' liens except to the limited extent of giving such liens prior-
ity so long as the mechanic retains possession unless another statute ex-
pressly provides otherwise.272 The relative rights of a secured party when
dealing with a mechanics' lien may be affected, however, by agreement be-
tween the parties. Thus, in Cranetex, Inc. v. Precision Crane & Rigging273 a
secured party who agreed to pay the cost of repairing construction equip-
ment was liable to the mechanic for the cost of repair and the mechanic's
claim was enforceable by means of a sale of the equipment under the
mechanic's lien and recovery of a deficiency judgment against the secured
party.274 In Collision Center Paint & Body, Inc. v. Campbell 275 the court
held that tender by a secured party of the full amount claimed by a mechanic
in a statutory notice of mechanics' lien discharged the lien and the subse-
quent retention of possession by the mechanic constituted conversion. 276
The secured party was held entitled to recover possession of the goods.277
Security Interests Versus Subrogees. The relative priority between an article
9 secured party and a surety who acquires subrogation rights in retained
construction funds has been litigated in several jurisdictions, 278 but until the
268. Id The bankruptcy court had reached the same result as the court of appeals, but on
the theory of intent rather than on a consideration of whether certificates of title were docu-
ments covered by Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.208(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). In re
C.M. Turtur Inv., Inc., 93 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
269. 764 S.W.2d 230 ('ex. 1988).
270. I11 at 232.
271. The case law is widely split on whether PIK payments and similar government agri-
cultural program payments are proceeds, general intangibles or accounts. See, eg., In re Sun-
berg, 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984) (PIK payments are general intangibles); In re Lions Farms,
Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1213 (D. Kan. 1987) (PIK payments are accounts because they
are made in exchange for the service of conservation management of unplanted land); United
States v. Carolina B. Chem. Co., 638 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1986) (PIK payments cannot be
proceeds since they are paid for not growing a crop); Osteroos v. Norwest Bank Minot, 604 F.
Supp. 848 (D.N.D. 1984) (PIK payments are proceeds).
272. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
273. 760 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
274. Id. at 305.
275. 773 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1989, no writ).
276. Id at 357.
277. Id at 358.
278. See, .eg., In re Pacific Marine Dredging & Constr., 79 Bankr. 924, 928 (Bankr. D. Or.
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decision in Interfirst Bank v. Pioneer Concrete279 the issue had not been ad-
dressed in Texas. In Interfirst, the Dallas court of appeals followed the ma-
jority rule that a surety who pays off laborers and material suppliers
following a default by a contractor is entitled to priority in any retainage
over the claim of a competing secured creditor.280 The court reached this
result on the theory of equitable subrogation of the surety to the rights of the
laborers and material suppliers whose liens it pays, whether or not those
liens were perfected.281
In another subrogation case282 the Austin court of appeals held that an
insurer who paid the proceeds of a fire insurance policy to the holder of a
note and deed of trust was subrogated to the rights of the holder against the
guarantors of the note.28 3 The court regarded an act of the holder discharg-
ing the guarantors' liability after payment by the insurer to constitute noth-
ing more than a question of fact as to the holder's authority to discharge the
obligation after the subrogation rights had already attached. 284 The court
reversed judgment in favor of the guarantors and remanded the case.2 5
D. Assignment of Claims
Right of Assignee to Retain Funds Paid by Account Debtor. The assignment
of contract rights or accounts is a common article 9 financing device. Sec-
tion 9.318 of the Code states some of the respective rights of the assignee and
the account debtor.286 In Irrigation Association v. First National Bank 287 the
court distinguished between the right of an account debtor to resist an action
by the assignee to collect on the debt in the face of a defense arising from the
underlying contract and the right of an account debtor to seek an affirmative
recovery against the assignee based on a claim arising from the same con-
tract.288 The court refused to apply section 9.318 in the latter case, and held
that the general law of restitution determined the rights of the parties where
an account debtor asserted a claim for recovery of a down payment made
jointly to the assignor and assignee.289 The court denied recovery against
1987) (surety entitled to priority over bank's security interest); In re Don's Elec., Inc., 65
Bankr. 399, 402 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986) (as subrogee, surety's right to retained funds supe-
rior to bank's claim); Alaska State Bank v. General Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1362, 1367 (Alaska
1978) (surety's claim as subrogee superior to bank's competing security interest).
279. 761 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
280. Id at 858.
281. Id. at 859.
282. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Gray, 775 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ
requested).
283. Id. at 687.
284. Id. at 688.
285. Id at 689.
286. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
In the context of negotiable instruments, the effect of the Federal Trade Commission holder in
due course rule must be taken into consideration in determining the rights and liabilities of an
assignee. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
287. 773 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
288. Id. at 350.
289. Id. This result is consistent with the limited number of other cases addressing the
issue. See, eg., Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 666 F.2d 673, 680 (1st Cir.
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the assignee under the general law of restitution.29°
Rights and Liabilities of Successors. Although not exclusively within the
area of assignments, two situations litigated during the Survey period de-
serve special mention because of the scope of their impact in a commercial
context. The first situation involved the purchase of one bank by another
bank, including an assignment of all contracts and other property owned by
the purchased bank. In United States v. Central National Bank 291 the court
held that in this situation of a complete purchase, the successor institution
remained liable for criminal violations of the Currency Transactions Report-
ing Act 292 committed by the purchased predecessor bank.293 The second
situation involved the sale of bank trust departments as an asset of failed
banks to other banking institutions. In two cases, one arising from the sale
of a failed state bank,294 and the other arising from the sale of a failed na-
tional bank,29 the court held that provisions of the Texas Trust Code re-
quiring court approval for the appointment of successor trustees296 did not
limit the power of the FDIC to sell the trust departments of failed banks to
solvent institutions.297 The court further held that this result obtains only if
1981) (neither § 9-318 nor pre-Code law allowed affimative recovery against assignee); Phil
Greer & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Bank, 614 F. Supp. 423, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (account
debtor with notice of assignment cannot assert affirmative claims against the assignee); Lydig
Constr., Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 40 Wash. App. 141, 697 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1985) (use of the
term "subject to" in section UCC § 9-318 does not create affirmative rights for recovery
against assignee; account debtor is limited to defensive use of claims);.
290. 773 S.W.2d at 351. Rather than holding that TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.315(rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990) was not applicable to the case, a better approach
might have been to hold that use of the term "subject to" in the section limits the account
debtor to using a claim defensively to reduce recovery by an assignee. See Lydig Constr., Inc.
v. Rainier Nat'1 Bank, 40 Wash. App. 141, 697 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1985). This approach would
prevent the assertion of claims under the general law that might appear more meritorious than
the restitution theory used in the case at bar.
291. 880 F.2d 828, (5th Cir. 1989),petitionfor cert filed, -S. Ct.-, (Nov. 13, 1989) (No.
89-785).
292. 12 U.S.C. § 214b (1988).
293. 880 F.2d at 830.
294. First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 707 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
295. NCNB Texas Nat'1 Bank v. Cowden, 712 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
296. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.083(a) (Vernon 1988).
297. In First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 707 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1989), the court reasoned
that the Texas Banking Code (TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-801 (Vernon 1973 & Supp.
1990)) preempts the Texas Trust Code (TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.083(a) (Vernon 1984))
in such cases because it permits a "limited intrusion" of banking liquidation procedures into
matters of trust law. 707 F. Supp. at 268-70.
In NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Cowden, 712 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Tex. 1989), the court held
that where the failed bank is a national bank, the supremacy clause of the U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2, and the powers granted to the FDIC to enter into purchase and assumption agreements
under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A) (1988), preempt the Texas Trust Code to the extent it is
inconsistent with federal law providing for the transfer of banking business to a successor
institution. 712 F. Supp. at 1253-55.
Further litigation on this subject is quite possible. The court noted in Cowden that the
affected:
fiduciary positions include approximately 1,000 appointments as executor, ad-
ministrator, or guardian of estates involved in proceedings pending in 96 Texas
Courts, over 9,000 corporate and employee benefit trusts, and more than 17,000
other trusts.. .The assets of the trusts are valued at approximately $50 billion
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the individual trust instruments contain no provisions to the contrary.298
E. Repossession and Resale of Collateral
Right of Secured Party to Foreclose. In a very interesting decision299 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a secured transaction includes an
implied promise by the debtor not to interfere with the right of the secured
party to foreclose and sell the collateral. 30° The court reached this result by
reasoning that section 9.503 of the Code30 1 specifically gives the secured
party the right to possession of the collateral and that every contract in-
cludes an implied promise that a party will refrain from doing anything that
will hinder or delay performance of the contract by the other party.302 The
debtor, therefore, was under an implied obligation to refrain from interfering
with the right to foreclose given to the secured party under the Code. By
refusing to permit the release of collateral to the secured party, the debtor
breached this obligation and became liable for attorney's fees incurred by the
secured party in seeking to enforce its foreclosure rights.30 3
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the imposition of an implied obligation
to refrain from interfering with foreclosure fell "far short" of implying a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.3°4 In Coleman v. FDIC305 the El
Paso court of appeals did not so restrict its ruling and found that a material
issue of fact existed as to whether the FDIC breached a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in delaying a real estate foreclosure for several months dur-
ing a period of apparently declining real estate values in the area.306 The
decision in Coleman conflicts with the decision in Lovell v. Western National
Life Insurance Co., 30 7 in which the court held no "special relationship" ex-
isted between a mortgagee-mortgagor to justify the imposition of a duty of
good faith and fair dealing.308
Commercial Reasonableness and the Disposition of Collateral The most ac-
tive area in secured transactions litigation during the Survey period revolved
around issues of whether the disposition of collateral was commercially rea-
sonable. Under Texas law, this issue is particular important because the fail-
ure to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner bars the
creditor from obtaining a deficiency judgment.30 9 Some courts disposed of
and produce a revenue stream for the fiduciary institution of nearly $100 million
a year.
Id. at 1250 n.2.
298. 712 F. Supp. at 1256-57.
299. Texas Nat'l Bank v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 872 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1989).
300. Id. at 698.
301. TE x. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1990).
302. 872 F.2d at 698 (citing Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 424 F. Supp. 482, 484
(N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd on this point 597 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979)).
303. Id. at 701.
304. Id. at 699.
305. 762 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ granted).
306. Id. at 244.
307. 754 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
308. Id. at 302.
309. The rule barring the recovery of a deficiency judgment if the disposition of collateral is
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cases on procedural grounds. 310 One case considered whether the exercise of
voting rights in stock by a secured party following a default amounted to a
disposition of collateral barring recovery of a deficiency judgement.311 The
court ruled that this issue presented a question of fact for the jury in light of
the language in the security agreement and the pending foreclosure suit.3 12
The court reversed judgment in favor of the debtors and remanded.313 An-
other case determined that a secured party who refused to release the certifi-
cate of title to an automobile after a loan had been fully paid was liable in
conversion for $2,000 in actual damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.3 14
The court reached this conclusion based on jury findings that the creditor
"had breached its guaranty agreement, had altered a security agreement, had
misrepresented the guaranty agreement, had engaged in an unconscionable
course of action, had committed fraud, had committed conversion and did
not have a security interest" as claimed.315
The remaining cases dealing with commercial reasonableness fall into two
categories: the first concerns the allocation of the burden of proving that a
sale of collateral was commercially reasonable or unreasonable;316 the sec-
ond is whether the price realized on the sale of collateral must be a fair and
reasonable price to permit the recovery of a deficiency. 317 In the first cate-
gory of proving the commercial reasonableness of a sale of collateral, the
most comprehensive discussion is contained in Chase Commercial Corp. v.
Datapoint Corp. 318
In Chase, the Dallas court of appeals held, first, that an assignor is a
debtor entitled to notice of disposition of collateral319 and second, that the
commercially unreasonable was first adopted in Texas in Tanenbaum v. Economics Labora-
tory, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1982).
310. Allied Bank v. Eshaghian, 700 F. Supp. 206, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion for sum-
mary judgment granted in favor of secured party where guarantors failed to raise questions of
material fact regarding the commercial reasonableness of the disposition of collateral under
Texas law); Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 S.W.2d 940, 943-44 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied) (debtors' failure to plead or prove conversion or wrongful disposition
of collateral at trial level waived right to raise issue for first time on appeal); Martinez v.
Corpus Christi Area Teachers Credit Union, 758 S.W.2d 946, 952 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, writ denied) (debtors' claims for improper preparation of note form and for wrongful
disposition of collateral barred by statute of limitations; usury claim mooted by bona fide error
doctrine).
311. Cohen v. Rains, 769 S.W.2d 380 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
312. Id. at 393.
313. Id
314. Lee County Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 761 S.W.2d 851, 853 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1988,
writ denied).
315. IdL at 853.
316. Molyneaux v. MBank Corpus Christi, N.A., 776 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1989, no writ); Plato v. Alvin State Bank, 775 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1989, no writ); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
317. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497 (5th Cir. 1989); Olney Say. &
Loan v. Farmers Market of Odessa, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 869 (rex. App.-E! Paso 1989, writ
requested).
318. 774 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
319. The court analogized the position of an assignor under a repurchase agreement to that
of a guarantor and reasoned that there was "no reason why a seller of chattel paper who owes
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secured creditor has the burden of pleading and proving the commercial rea-
sonableness of the disposition as part of the creditor's principal case in chief
without need for the debtor to raise the issue by specifically pleading an
affirmative defense on this issue.320 The court left little room for doubt
about the meaning of its decision by stating, "We hold that notice and the
disposition of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner are essential
elements of a creditor's suit to recover a deficiency, and the creditor bears
the burden to plead and prove notice and disposition of the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner. ' 321 The other cases reached similar deci-
sions,322 but without the extensive discussion contained in Chase.
The cases dealing with the price realized from the sale of collateral are
perhaps the most interesting of the secured transactions cases litigated dur-
ing the Survey period. In Olney Savings & Loan Association v. Farmers Mar-
ket of Odessa, Inc. 323 the creditor bid in the property at foreclosure for
$150,000 and sold it eight days later for $200,000, the previously appraised
value.324 The court adopted the "rule" suggested in Lee v. Sabine Bank 325
that a creditor is under a trust arrangement with a borrower to make an
honest effort to realize the best possible price from a sale of collateral.326
The court held that the evidence of price disparity sufficiently raised a ques-
tion for the jury whether the foreclosure price was "fair and reasonable"
and, if not, what a fair and reasonable price would be.327 The defendants in
Savers Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Reetz328 subsequently cited 01-
other performance by way of repurchase of paper from its assignee should not likewise be held
to be a 'debtor' under the Code." Id at 363.
320. Id at 364. Prior Texas case law, without authoritative guidance from the Texas
Supreme Court, had almost reached this point by requiring the secured party to go forward
with proof of commercial reasonableness when the debtor raised the issue by denying that a
sale had been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. See, ag., Schultz v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 704 S.W.2d 797, 798 ((Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ), overruled,
Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no
writ); M.P. Crum Co. v. First Sw. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 704 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1986, no writ); Sunjet, Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 703 S.W. 2d 285, 288 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985, no writ), overruled, Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
321. 774 S.W.2d at 364.
322. See Molyneaux v. MBank Corpus Christi, N.A., 776 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (notice of sale and commercial reasonableness of sale are ele-
ments of the secured party's cause of action); Plato v. Alvin State Bank, 775 S.W.2d 861, 862
(Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1989, no writ) (commercial reasonableness of sale is element
of secured party's cause of action).
323. 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ requested).
324. Id. at 871.
325. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
326. Id. at 584. In Lee the court said that a proven significant disparity between the sale
price of collateral and the appraisal value should give the debtor a deficiency offset measured
by the fair market value of the collateral instead of the foreclosure sale price when the creditor
is the successful bidder. In Olney, however, the lack of evidence of the fair market value
resulted in the court's being unable to apply the rule that it announced. The further statements
in Lee about a trust arrangement with the borrower are entirely dicta. Subsequently, in Halter
v. Allied Merchants Bank, 751 S.W.2d 286 (rex.App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied), the
court referred to Lee with approval, but once again in dicta. 751 S.W.2d at 287.
327. 764 S.W.2d at 871.
328. 888 F.2d 1497 (5th Cir. 1989).
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ney as authority for the use of fair market value as the proper amount to
offset against a deficiency judgment. 329 In a lengthy analysis of the origins of
the fair market value formula, the Fifth Circuit left no doubt about its strong
disagreement with Lee v. Sabine Bank 330 and its progeny, including Olney,
and refused to apply what it regarded as an aberrational development in the
Texas law on the disposition of collateral.331 Commercial lawyers will be
interested in seeing the effect of this severe criticism of the Lee rule.
329. Id. at 1505-06.
330. 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
331. At the end of its analysis, the court stated:
In this diversity case we are bound to apply Texas law, whether or not we
"agree" with it. But it is settled Texas law that a Texas Court of Appeals must,
in civil cases, follow the law as established by the Texas Supreme Court. The
dicta in Lee, Halter, and Olney, relied on by appellants, is contrary to the Texas
Supreme Court's holding in Tarrant Savings Ass'n. Moreover, the Texas
Supreme Court's holdings in Maupin and Musick taken together likewise de-
mand rejection of this dicta.
888 F.2d at 1506.
The cases referred to by the court in the quoted paragraph are: Lee v. Sabine Bank, 708
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Halter v. Allied Merchants Bank,
751 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied); Olney Sav. & Loan v. Farm-
ers Market of Odessa Inc., Inc., 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ requested);
Tarrant Savings Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965); Maupin v.
Chaney, 139 Tex. 426, 163 S.W.2d 380, 382-84 (1942); and American Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975).
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